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 1 
 “The toughest thing about being captured was that you had no control over your life 
whatsoever.  They controlled it.  You were under their domination.  I was their slave.  Whatever 
they wanted me to do, I did it, or else.”  —Tom Grove, captured January 19451 
 
 Prisoners of war occupy a uniquely vulnerable position in armed conflict.  Often 
immediately following the stress of combat, captured service members find themselves under the 
complete control of mortal enemies.  Upon capture, they lose their status as combatants and 
become subject to a new set of legal expectations.  Grove’s recollection reveals the difficulty that 
he and his fellow prisoners faced in trying to fulfill those expectations.  Even though his training 
taught him not to cooperate with the enemy, resistance was exceedingly dangerous.  When the 
guards’ orders were enforced with violence and death, what else was there to do but comply? 
 In the European Theater, successful prisoners were flexible, resourceful, and maintained 
their personal and national identities despite dehumanizing conditions.  They were 
uncompromising in the preservation of a sense of self, but amended or abandoned many other 
cultural narratives about bravery, honesty, and masculinity in order to survive.   
 Support for this observation comes in large part from the prisoners themselves.  Survivor 
Charles Stenger offers a clear articulation of his own: “I had a role still, a personality, an identity.  
I just kept saying to myself over and over, ‘I am not a prisoner of war.’”2   
 Ex-prisoner recollections, both written and oral, constitute a large proportion of the 
available literature.  Some diaries and other writings generated during the war exist, although 
they are comparatively rare due to the difficulty prisoners had obtaining writing materials and 
 
1 Tom Bird, American POWs of World War II: Forgotten Men Tell Their Stories (Westport: 
Praeger, 1992), 81. 
2 Ibid, 37. 
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keeping them concealed from guards during captivity.  Correspondence in and out of prison 
camps was limited and strictly censored.  The result is a historical record that relies significantly, 
though not totally, on documents produced after the fact.  They are firsthand accounts in that 
their narrators directly experienced the events contained therein, but they are subject to the 
fallibility of human recollection.  Published post-repatriation accounts, even those that were 
originally created during captivity, are further limited to the perspective of survivors, and often 
those with the most dramatic or heroic (and thus marketable) stories.  While it is unlikely that 
any significant portion of memoirists or interviewees are given to outright fabrication, these 
narratives must be taken if not with skepticism, with awareness of an incomplete documentary 
record. 
 This project uses accounts from ten Americans held in Germany: Tom Grove, Charles 
Stenger, Mario Garbin, Peter Neft, Richard Keirn, Hugh Colbert, Robert “Bob” Corbin, Henry 
“Hank” Freedman, Bill Blackmon, and Claudio “Steve” Carano (who took care to record not 
only his own story, but that of Joe “Slim” Lassiter and several more of his fellow prisoners as 
well in his YMCA-provided journal).3   
 
Defining Mandates 
 Modern American service members, upon capture, are bound by a six-part code of 
conduct.  This code instructs prisoners to affirm their American identities, retain their command 
structures as much as possible, and resist the enemy in every possible way.  However, this code 
 
3 Garbin, Grove, Neft, and Stenger are recorded in American POWs of World War II: Forgotten 
Men Tell Their Stories, edited by Tom Bird.  Keirn gave an interview to the National Prisoner of 
War Museum.  Colbert, Corbin, and Freedman gave interviews to the National WWII Museum.  
Blackmon and Carano’s stories are recorded in Not Without Honor: The Nazi POW Journal of 
Steve Carano; With Accounts by John C. Bitzer and Bill Blackmon, edited by Kay Sloan. 
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was not drafted until after the conclusion of the Second World War.  Although the United States 
lacked any equivalent to the modern code of conduct in its simplicity and wide applicability, the 
War Department did compile a list of instructions for service members, especially air personnel, 
who were at risk of capture.4 
 Published in 1944, the M.I.S.-X Manual for Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (hereafter, 
M.I.S.-X Manual) outlined the importance of operational security, ways to conceal sensitive 
information upon capture, and detailed explanations of various interrogation strategies.  The 
manual repeatedly emphasized the dangers of revealing even small amounts of intelligence to the 
enemy and admonished service members not to give into coercion or promises of better 
conditions.  “As a P.O.W. you not only represent a temporary loss of manpower, but you have 
become a potential danger to your country,” the manual states.5  Prisoners were encouraged to 
resist wherever possible and avoid cooperating unduly with the enemy (although, per the Geneva 
convention of 1929, enlisted personnel could be compelled to work), and escape was 
encouraged.  The manual extensively covered the recommended strategies for evading capture in 
enemy territory and escaping once confined to a prison camp, but offered little guidance on how 
to survive when escape was not feasible.  There is some evidence that service members received 
other forms of training—Bill Blackmon recalled a lecture from an escapee from Stalag XVII-B, 
the same camp where he and his friend Steve Carano would later be interned—but many 
 
4 U.S. War Department, Military Intelligence Service, “M.I.S.-X Manual on Evasion, Escape, 
and Survival,” (Washington, DC, February 1944). 
5 U.S. War Department, “M.I.S.-X Manual,” Resisting Interrogation 3. 
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memoirists reported that they never seriously considered the possibility that they themselves 
would someday face captivity.6 
 American war memory depicts the prisoner of war experience as a monumental test of 
will and resilience.  Surviving ex-prisoners’ accounts of violence, starvation, and disease 
certainly support this idea.  However, this cultural perception appears not to have developed until 
later in the twentieth century.  While modern prisoners who conduct themselves honorably are 
granted a medal upon repatriation, no such award existed during and after the Second World 
War.  The War Department considered captivity to be a challenging experience, but no more so 
than any a service member could expect, especially in a combat role.7  The M.I.S.-X Manual, 
despite its many cautions and warnings, denied that prisoners would encounter violence from 
German captors and encouraged prisoners to insist on strict adherence to the Geneva Convention, 
with a rather optimistic injunction to “LEARN YOUR RIGHTS AND YOU CAN’T GO 
WRONG.”8   
 While that line seems naïve when placed next to accounts of hardship and starvation, it is 
worth noting that Americans held in Germany were usually treated in accordance with the 
Geneva Convention.  Several American prisoners noted that their counterparts from Russia, 
which was not a signatory, fared noticeably worse than they did.9   
 
6 Bill Blackmon, “Bill Blackmon’s Story,” in Not Without Honor: The Nazi POW Journal of 
Steve Carano; With Accounts by John C. Bitzer and Bill Blackmon ed. Kay Sloan (Fayetteville: 
University of Arkansas Press, 2008), 135. 
7Arieh J. Kochavi, Confronting Captivity: Britain and the United States and their POWs in Nazi 
Germany (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005): 102. 
8 U.S. War Department, “M.I.S.-X Manual,” Geneva Convention 15. 
9 Carano, Claudio, “A Wartime Log,” in Not Without Honor: The Nazi POW Journal of Steve 
Carano; With Accounts by John C. Bitzer and Bill Blackmon, ed. Kay Sloan (Fayetteville: 
University of Arkansas Press, 2008), 37. 
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 The M.I.S.-X Manual is a useful estimation of prisoners’ expectations.  Despite its 
limitations (in addition to the fundamental difference between theory and practice, it was 
published after some of these service members were captured), its instructions offer a portrait of 
the quintessential American prisoner of war.  The ideal survivor is loyal and smart.  He 
understands the risk of capture and knows what to expect when he arrives at a prison camp.  He 
maintains organization.  When questioned, he knows to remain silent and ultimately 
professional, because “the Germans are a military people, even in defeat… and they will respect 
you if you are as military as they.”10  He avoids speaking even about trivial things, lest he be led 
into revealing classified information or caught in a lie.  He has a commitment to “remain always, 
even in captivity, the enemy of the enemy.”11 
 On this last point, most surviving ex-prisoners seem successful.  Their accounts, 
unsurprisingly, show little affection for their former captors, and in some cases express bitter 
resentment.  Although he did not participate himself, Bill Blackmon recalled that several 
prisoners even murdered their former guards upon liberation.12  However, their opportunities for 
resistance could be limited.  Beyond the hunger and depression that many reported, some lived 
with a constant threat of violence: Steve Perun witnessed the murder of a prisoner who built an 
illicit crystal radio.13  Perhaps it is not unexpected, then, that almost no accounts project the cool 
professionalism advised by the M.I.S.-X Manual.  
 The question of expectations for prisoners, then, was not only legal but cultural.  There 
were few offenses for which a prisoner might be court-martialed upon repatriation.  However, 
 
10 U.S. War Department, “M.I.S.-X Manual,” Resisting Interrogation 8. 
11 Ibid, 9. 
12 Blackmon, “Bill Blackmon’s Story,” in Not Without Honor, 144. 
13 Bird, American POWs of World War II, 70-71. 
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the cultural stigma around surrender and captivity ran deep, and made its way into some of the 
communications that prisoners received from home.  One anonymous contributor to Carano’s 
book lamented that “one ‘father’ (if he can be called that) wrote his son never to come home 
again, as he was not welcome, for he was a quitter.  Girlfriends even wrote, ‘You’re a yellow-
bellied quitter otherwise you wouldn’t be a prisoner; you gave up.  So I am marrying a man with 
courage…’”14  It was known that despondency and loss of purpose could hamstring prisoners’ 
efforts at survival and escape, but it was likely disorienting to have such discouraging language 
come from home and family as well as German guards.  The men staved off hopelessness by 
writing scathing, occasionally sarcastic replies.  “You haven’t got a weapon and you can’t even 
stand up to run, but if it was you, “my hero,” I bet you would have some fun… but every man 
here has done his part, to preserve Democracy,” wrote one.15 
 
Surrender and the Beginning of Captivity 
 Perhaps at the root of the relative apathy of both the government and the public towards 
the plight of captivity was the sense of embarrassment and shame at the idea of surrender that 
many ex-prisoners reported.  As much as service members dreaded the possibility of capture, the 
moment of surrender was not always marked by a violent struggle or dramatic show of 
resistance.  As far as the War Department was concerned, those captured in Europe were not 
expected to fight to the last, although the M.I.S.-X. Manual did suggest that “should the Japanese 
resume their policy of executing flyers, it might be preferable to shoot it out when capture 
appears certain, so as to take some Japs with you.”16 
 
14 Carano, “A Wartime Log,” in Not Without Honor, 67. 
15 Ibid, 68. 
16 U.S. War Department, “M.I.S.-X Manual,” Prisoner of War Camps 16. 
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 For all its advice on evasion and escape, the M.I.S.-X Manual was silent on the question 
of how a service member should behave when confronted by Germans behind enemy lines.  
Those who found themselves shot down or cut off in unfriendly territory were advised to 
abandon any weapons during attempts at evasion, so that they could not be accused of 
espionage.17  It could be extrapolated that anyone who had followed those guidelines would not 
be able to resist if they were located by the enemy. 
 Downed pilots made up a substantial portion of captured Americans during the war.  
When planes went down over enemy-occupied territory, their crews were isolated and often 
wounded from the crash.  Depending on the population density around the crash site and the 
altitude at which the crew bailed out, enemy searchers could close in on stranded airmen very 
shortly after the landing.  A crew’s prospects for evasion hinged largely on where they landed.  If 
they were in the vicinity of sympathetic civilians, who the M.I.S.-X. Manual advised were in 
abundance, then they might join the ranks of the 338 prisoners who had evaded capture by 
January 1943.18  To give downed airmen the best chance at evasion, the War Department 
furnished each of them with an aids box of basic supplies so that they could cover a long distance 
even if help was not forthcoming.19  However, those who crashed too close to the enemy could 
find themselves cornered before attempting evasion at all.  Not all airmen had time to bury their 
parachutes or distance themselves from the crash site as instructed. 
 Claudio “Steve” Carano was one such aviator, a radioman who went down with an Army 
plane on December 1, 1943.  The plane was badly damaged over Cologne, Germany.  The crew 
turned for their British air base and continued to exchange fire with German fighters until they 
 
17 U.S. War Department, “M.I.S.-X Manual,” Evasion in Europe 5. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid, 7-8. 
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were forced to ditch in the sea, a short distance off the coast of Holland.  Carano and six others 
of the ten-man crew survived the impact.  A Dutch rowboat fished them out of the water and 
turned them over to German occupiers without resistance.20  Even when recounting the more 
dramatic story of Joe “Slim” Lassiter, who was shot down over German-occupied France and 
evaded the enemy for some time, Carano emphasized how quickly the moment of capture came.  
After traveling across France with the help of many different sympathetic locals, one of them 
alerted the Gestapo, and Lassiter was captured with his fellow airmen.  “And from out of 
nowhere pistols appeared dangerously pointed at his [Lassiter’s] face. … The whole crew sat 
dazed, this just couldn’t be—but here it was staring them in the face.”21  To that point, Lassiter 
and his crewmates had kept to the War Department’s instructions and been generally successful.  
Their bid for freedom ended when they failed to recognize a Nazi collaborator among those who 
offered them assistance.  Fear of exposing organizations of helpers prevented stranded Allies 
from confirming the identities or intentions of their benefactors.22 
 Capture, however, was not always a question of opportunity for evasion.  As much as 
service members loathed the prospect of surrender, some chose to do so.  Charles Stenger, a 
medic, held up an improvised white flag when it became clear he and his fellow medical 
personnel could not adequately treat their soldiers’ wounds.  “We wanted to get some help from 
the Germans because we knew they were the only ones around,” remembered Stenger.  “They 
responded very well.”23  Even though Stenger argued that he was a noncombatant under the 
 
20 Carano, “A Wartime Log,” in Not Without Honor, 32. 
21 Ibid, 57. 
22 U.S. War Department, “M.I.S.-X Manual,” Evasion in Europe 13. 
23 Bird, American POWs of World War II, 47. 
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Geneva Convention, the Germans denied him permission to return to Allied lines, and he 
remained with the surrendered casualties. 
 Some personnel surrendered voluntarily, with even less question as to their status.  When 
it became clear that a group of Americans was isolated and outmatched, without the realistic 
possibility of causing significant damage to the enemy, surrender was considered the only viable 
option.  At the Battle of the Bulge, Mario Garbin and his fellow soldiers found themselves in 
such circumstances.  German officers approached the American forces under a flag of truce and 
warned that the position was surrounded, offering surrender rather than destruction.  An officer 
named Moon accepted the offer and ordered his men to stand down.  Everyone obeyed except for 
one Polish refugee, who had to be “knock[ed] to the ground and tie[d] up.”24  Still, before 
vacating their position, Garbin and his comrades took care to disable or sabotage their weapons 
and vehicles.  Further west, Hugh Colbert’s battalion was facing down an advancing group of 
German tanks when they realized that they were badly outmatched.  “We couldn’t do any good 
firing… that little carbine was just pinging off like a BB gun.”25  Though Colbert didn’t know 
exactly who it was, an officer made the decision that it would be useless to do anything but 
throw down arms and surrender to the tankers. 
 Clearly surrender was sometimes unavoidable, as undesirable as it was.  Still, some 
prisoners resented its necessity and even went so far as to place blame on other soldiers for 
making their positions untenable.  “Couple of those guys [28th Infantry Division], they were next 
to us.  And they said “you guys chickened out and got us captured” … I knew myself that I’d 
done all I could,” remembered Colbert.26  The animosity from his fellow men was discouraging, 
 
24 Ibid, 55. 
25 Hugh Colbert, Interview for the National WWII Museum.  New Orleans, 2015. 
26 Ibid. 
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but Colbert was confident that he had fulfilled his duty.  For the 28th ID members who held him 
in such low regard, it may have been a matter of finding an explanation for their own unenviable 
position.  As the writers of the M.I.S.-X. Manual realized, “you always feel it can’t happen to 
you.”27 
 Once taken into custody, prisoners of war were moved away from the lines of battle.  For 
most prisoners held in Germany, the first stop was a short-term camp called a Dulag (Durchgang 
Lager, or “transit camp” according to the War Department’s translation).28  These camps were 
devoted to the purpose of formal interrogation. 
 
Interrogation 
 The War Department feared the danger to secrecy more than the cost of men and materiel 
when service members were captured, devoting a full section of the M.I.S.-X Manual to the 
subject of interrogation.  Although the Manual assured service members that they were unlikely 
to be beaten or tortured for information (“The Nazi … uses all possible means short of actual 
violence to make you talk”), it warned of various psychological tricks that the Germans might 
use to pressure a prisoner into revealing sensitive information.29  Personnel were admonished not 
to attempt lying or talking only about unclassified matters, as it was all too easy to mistakenly 
say something true or valuable.30  Bill Blackmon’s account mirrored the Manual’s warning 
almost exactly.  He did not experience violence, but instead was held in solitary confinement for 
a few days and refused to answer questions until the interrogators gave up and sent him on to 
 
27 U.S. War Department, “M.I.S.-X Manual,” Introduction—Security 6. 
28 Ibid, Prisoner of War Camps 3. 
29 Ibid, Resisting Interrogation 8. 
30 Ibid, 17-18. 
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Stalag XVII B.31  Similarly, Robert “Bob” Corbin flustered his interrogation officer by refusing 
to answer questions regarding military matters, although he did respond to more innocent 
questions, despite the M.I.S.-X. Manual’s injunctions to the contrary.32  After being shot down 
over Leipzig, Richard Keirn had a similar, if more immediately frightening experience.  After 
pressing Keirn for details about the type of aircraft he flew, the Germans threatened to execute 
him, following through on the bluff as far as blindfolding him and leading him outside, only to 
send him on to a permanent camp unharmed.33  Keirn remembered the experience with a dose of 
perspective, as he felt it was much easier to be interrogated by the Germans during the Second 
World War than it was during his seven years of captivity in the Vietnam War. 
 Steve Perun, a machine gunner captured on the Normandy beachhead, soon found that 
not all interrogation officers were so scrupulous in their observation of the Geneva Convention.  
“[A German colonel] wanted to know a lot of stuff and we, of course, weren’t allowed to tell him 
anything.  He slapped me around quite a bit.”34  Lassiter did not report personally experiencing 
violence, but he learned of British prisoners who were “thoroughly flogged in order to gain 
information” and a Hungarian who “had been beaten up so badly that he feared he might weaken 
and give the names of his associates, so he committed suicide.”35   
 However, both men only mentioned this violence in passing, and did not elaborate further 
on any interrogation.  Lassiter’s account only says that he and his cohort “went through their 
interrogation to no avail.”36  Henry “Hank” Freedman’s interrogation ended similarly.  His 
 
31 Blackmon, “Bill Blackmon’s Story,” in Not Without Honor, 138. 
32 Robert Corbin, Interview for the National WWII Museum.  New Orleans, 2015. 
33 Richard Keirn, Interview for the National Prisoner of War Museum.  Pensacola, 1996. 
34 Bird, American POWs of World War II, 68. 
35 Carano, “A Wartime Log,” in Not Without Honor, 64. 
36 Ibid, 64. 
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cohort was asked to fill out paperwork regarding their origins and family histories, which 
Freedman felt was part of a continued effort to realize the Holocaust.  When the men refused, 
they were forced to stand outside in winter weather for several hours, but received no further 
interrogation.  “We found out that the Germans were very impatient people.”37  
 Meanwhile, Hugh Colbert was spared even preliminary questioning.  “I was never really 
interrogated… we did have to give our name, rank, and serial number.”38  A significant 
proportion of ex-prisoners do not mention interrogation in their accounts at all, focusing instead 
on the challenge of survival in the inhospitable conditions of German camps.  The absence is 
conspicuous, although it could potentially be explained by the usually short duration of 
interrogation periods relative to the total length of captivity (the M.I.S.-X Manual admonished 
that any man kept at a Dulag for more than a week or two had to be useful in some way to the 
Germans).39  For all the War Department’s warnings about clever deceptions, bullying threats, 
and microphones in trees, some surviving prisoners either were not interrogated like Colbert, did 
not count interrogation as an important enough part of their time in captivity to add it to their 
recollections, or else did not want to commit those experiences to the public record. 
 In any case, none of these ten survivors reported even the temptation to reveal sensitive 
information, and were generally sent on to permanent camps after a short time.  Once there, the 
torrent of advice from the M.I.S.-X. Manual dries up.  Beyond obvious requirements to remain 
loyal to the United States, maintain the secrecy established during the interrogation period, and 
attempt escape or harass the enemy wherever possible, little guidance on how to survive is 
provided.   
 
37 Henry Freedman, Interview for the National WWII Museum.  New Orleans, 2015. 
38 Hugh Colbert, Interview for the National WWII Museum.  New Orleans, 2015. 
39 U.S. War Department, “M.I.S.-X Manual,” Resisting Interrogation 6. 
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Rank, Privilege, and Respect 
 The War Department generally expected captured Americans to retain military structure 
wherever possible.  Prisoners of higher rank were tasked with command, and those below them 
with supporting officers and maintaining discipline.  The preservation of order was intended to 
keep the men grounded and help organize efforts at both resistance and survival.  It was not 
uncommon for prisoners to organize into committees both official and unofficial to further those 
ends.40  “The Germans controlled the fences and the guard towers, but inside, Americans were 
running the show,” remembered Bob Corbin.41 
 The leader of a cohort of prisoners could have been previously in command or elected by 
the prisoners themselves.  In either case, if the officer was competent, composed, and helped 
prisoners maintain both their safety and dignity, he could expect them to treat him with the 
respect due his position.  Steve Carano took care to record a rousing Independence Day speech 
by a highly-respected “Stalag camp leader” Kenneth Kurtenbach: “Still, we carry on with the 
traditions and ideals as laid down by the makers of our country on that great Fourth of July 1776. 
… Although we are enclosed by a barbed wire fence and ringed by our enemies, and although we 
have broken wings, our spirits still and will fly high.”42  By connecting the prisoners under his 
leadership with American history and values, Kurtenbach not only earned respect, but likely 
contributed to the psychological resilience of those who heard him.  Carano was impressed 
enough to commit one of his limited diary pages to Kurtenbach’s speech.  Kurtenbach, for his 
part, displayed physical leadership as well as rhetorical.  He once intervened in a botched escape 
 
40 Ibid, Prisoner of War Camps 7. 
41 Robert Corbin, Interview for the National WWII Musuem.  New Orleans, 2015. 
42 Carano, “A Wartime Log,” in Not Without Honor, 71-72. 
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attempt, preventing the guards from killing a wounded escapee and earning a rifle butt to the jaw 
for his trouble.43 
 Peter Neft felt that his German captors were impressed with his approach to leadership 
when he agreed to trade cells with two wounded enlisted men.  “Here I was, an officer, giving up 
my warm cell to my two sergeants with broken legs.”44  Neft believed the Germans were 
surprised at his willingness to give up the privileges of his rank, especially in a situation as 
demoralizing as captivity.   
 The formalities of rank and respect were not always so closely followed, however.  Per 
the Geneva Convention, prisoners were expected to render salutes when they encountered 
officers of the military which held them.  American service members were warned that refusal to 
“conform to local rules” could result in punishment according to the enemy’s own law, 
including, if the offense was severe enough, a court martial.45  Mario Garbin remembered that his 
British counterparts tended to comply with the Convention and saluted their captors.  However, 
not all of the Americans followed suit, sometimes with choice words.  “I’m not going to salute 
that fucking son of a bitch,” Garbin remembered an American captive saying, to the chagrin of 
his straight-laced British peer.46  If the prisoner’s attitude was not precisely in line with 
international law, he did make true the cultural narrative of defiant prisoners, and certainly 
succeeded in remaining “the enemy of the enemy.” 
 Garbin’s own conduct flouted Geneva Convention expectations of rank.  Although 
Garbin was a private first class, he heard that non-commissioned officers could expect much 
 
43 Joseph R. Kurtenbach, “War Behind the Wire: Life and Escape from Stalag 17B,” Air Power 
History 58, no. 4 (Winter 2011): 10. 
44 Bird, American POWs of World War II, 89. 
45 U.S. War Department, “M.I.S.-X Manual,” Geneva Convention 8. 
46 Bird, American POWs of World War II, 57. 
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better treatment than junior enlisted personnel like himself, so he forged papers that listed him as 
a Staff Sergeant.47  Garbin’s deception was certainly resourceful and saved him from the rougher 
handling and hard labor requirement that he would have received according to his true rank, but 
it did cause friction between him and the actual sergeants in his camp.  Garbin disregarded both 
international law and the War Department’s own orders, which required captured Americans to 
honestly identify themselves.  A sergeant threatened to reveal Garbin’s lie to the guards, a 
predicament which he solved by menacing the officer with a bread knife.48 
 Slim Lassiter had a more amicable relationship with the senior officer in his small cohort 
of captured airmen, but took issue over the fairness of food distribution.  When the officer 
received food for himself and his cellmates, he “would carefully examine each bit in size and 
give the other men the smaller pieces, keeping the largest for himself.”49  Lassiter objected, 
resulting in a series of arguments between the prisoners and several weeks of frosty interactions 
between Lassiter and the officer, although they eventually smoothed things over.  
 In 2012, a pair of social scientists found that prisoners who were subject to stricter 
hierarchy of rank were statistically less likely to survive than those in looser organizations, 
perhaps because the chain of command was ill-suited to adapt to the different environment and 
goals of service members in prison camps than on the battlefield.50  Anecdotally, prisoners like 
Garbin and Lassiter might agree, while prisoners like Carano who held their officers in high 
regard would be less likely to do so.  The researchers were able to control for some differences in 
the conditions of individual camps, but one significant limitation to their findings is that the only 
 
47 Ibid, 56-57. 
48 Ibid, 59. 
49 Carano, “A Wartime Log,” in Not Without Honor, 63. 
50 Clifford G. Holderness and Jeffrey Pontiff, “Hierarchies and the Survival of Prisoners of War 
During World War II,” Management Science 58, no. 10 (2012): 1883. 
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data they were able to analyze was quantitative.  There is no mathematical definition of good 
leadership.  Structure gave officers like Lassiter’s hungry senior and Garbin’s jealous sergeant 
the opportunity to decrease their subordinates’ quality of life, while more selfless officers like 
Kutenbach earned respect through their positions.  Still, after several years of engagement, the 
War Department maintained that organization was an important tool for holding off the 
hopelessness dubbed “barbed-wire fever.”51 
 
Escape Attempts 
 Perhaps the most dramatic and celebrated aspect of the prisoner of war story in war 
memory is the possibility of escape.  The War Department admonished service members that 
“even if you have the misfortune of becoming a prisoner, YOU ARE NOT OUT OF THE 
WAR.”52  Prisoners stayed in the fight by planning, aiding, and attempting escape.  Even if they 
were unsuccessful, they could gain intelligence about the surrounding area that could be valuable 
to the next runner, and tie up German personnel and resources during the search. 
 Actually escaping custody, however, was easier said than done.  Tom Grove knew that 
his best chance of getting away would come while he was in transit, before he arrived at a 
permanent prison camp.  While on a forced march, Grove thought he might be able to get away 
by working his way to the back of his group and eventually falling out of line.  As he approached 
the rear, he saw the German guards beating the wounded who were not able to keep up, and he 
decided against making the attempt.53 
 
51 U.S. War Department, “M.I.S.-X Manual,” Prisoner of War Camps 9. 
52 Ibid, Escape – Europe 3. 
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 Sometimes, even if prisoners had the opportunity to escape, they realized that their 
chances of making it back to Allied lines were so slim that they chose not to take the risk.  Most 
had no knowledge of the surrounding area, no supplies, and did not speak French or German.  
They knew they would not get far without assistance, especially if they were wounded, and that 
assistance was not always forthcoming.  Thus, some prisoners found themselves in the position 
of passing up otherwise viable escape opportunities.  Steve Perun and Peter Neft both reported 
that some guards even handed the prisoners their rifles so that they could use both hands to climb 
into a truck.  “I could have shot everybody there and got away,” remembered Perun.  “But where 
in the world would I have gone?”54   
 Neft did find another chance to attempt escape later on, after he discovered that he could 
reach the deadbolt of his holding cell from the inside.  Neft let himself out and made for the 
wilderness, but was almost immediately seen by the guards.  Fearing that he would be shot, he 
surrendered without further incident, and was placed in a cell with a better lock.55 
 Once at permanent camps, escape was more difficult, but prisoners could expect more 
unsupervised time and better coordination.  Since directly breaching the barbed wire circling the 
camp was almost certain to attract the attention of the guards, the most common course of action 
was to attempt tunneling.56  Over Carano’s objections, Bill Blackmon participated in one such 
effort.  He and his co-conspirators were thwarted when a guard found the hollowed-out ground 
as he probed the yard with a steel rod.57  Carano himself planned to escape, even writing a ‘just-
in-case’ letter to his wife, but reconsidered and never made the attempt. 
 
54 Ibid, 69. 
55 Ibid, 89. 
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 Bob Corbin remembered the chaos at Oflag 64 when Russian forces closed in on the 
prisoners’ location.  The German guards were dispatched to hold the Russians off, and only one 
guard was left to supervise the American prisoners.58  Corbin estimated that five hundred of his 
fellow prisoners made their escape, but he did not go with them for fear of becoming entangled 
with the Russian army.  If Corbin regretted that decision, he did not say so even as he described 
hunger and illness on the subsequent march north to Poland as the prisoners fled the Russians 
and the long trek back into Germany.  Eventually interned at Hammelburg, Corbin’s next 
opportunity came when a task force from the American 4th Armored Division raided the camp.  
The tankers, however, could only take a few hundred prisoners with them, so some remained 
inside the camp and others, including Corbin, took their chances leaving on foot.  “I’d always 
had the dumb idea that if you got outside the barbed wire and you were smart enough, you had 
about a 50/50 chance of getting back,” Corbin explained.59  Corbin and a handful of his friends 
would soon learn just how long those odds really were.  After days of moving only at night, no 
food, and several close calls when they found themselves just yards away from unaware German 
soldiers, they were finally picked up by an American reconnaissance squadron. “I wouldn’t take 
a million dollars for what that experience taught me, but I wouldn’t give you a nickel to do it 
again,” said Corbin.60 
 Despite its insistence that escapees could only be subject to disciplinary punishment, the 
government was aware that efforts at escape were dangerous.  Geneva Convention 
notwithstanding, prisoners actively engaged in escape were often subject to violence.  To further 
complicate matters, imperfect adherence to the Convention led to a series of reprisals on both the 
 




Allied and Axis sides.  Of the 76 prisoners who tunneled out of Stalag Luft III (the breakout 
made famous by The Great Escape,) all but three were recaptured in short order.  50 of those 
returned to captivity were summarily executed.61 
 Successful escape from prisoner of war camps remained quite rare.  Most prisoners had 
to live with the reality that they would not be able to return home until the war ended, and that 
they would not be able to fulfill the ideal of the dogged and determined escapee.  Their many 
unsuccessful attempts met the goal of further draining German resources and manpower, but few 
prisoners came home with a story that ended with a heroic bid for freedom. 
 
Theft, Lies, and Defiance 
 After the war, Charles Stenger felt that defiance in the face of the Germans, though at 
times perilous, was central to the maintenance of prisoner morale.  “What you learn immediately 
is that if you don’t do exactly what you are told, you will be killed.  So you quickly learn to 
comply, which contributes to a continuing sense of fear that at any moment you can be killed or 
injured,” he admitted.  Still, “we would test the limits that we could put on the guards.  In other 
words, if we got them angry we wouldn’t feel so powerless.”62 
 One common way to push back on the stress and loss of agency that came with captivity 
was to steal from the German guards.  Theft had a dual purpose—it bolstered the prisoners’ 
meager rations and harassed their captors, giving prisoners a way to fight back even though they 
were out of combat.  Stenger remembered that some prisoners went beyond the essentials.  “We 
managed to steal quite a bit of food, including some of the guys even stole some German medals, 
 
61 S. P. Mackenzie, “The Treatment of Prisoners of War in World War II,” The Journal of 
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like the Iron Cross.”63  Stenger did not look back on the theft of the medals as an unnecessary 
risk, but instead reminisced about the futile rage that it caused the Germans. 
 Theft, however, was risky.  Tom Grove recounted a harrowing story of two GIs’ 
disastrous attempt to lift food from a German storehouse.  When challenged by a guard, they 
panicked and attacked, injuring him.  For a time, they successfully disappeared into the ranks of 
their fellow prisoners.  The enraged guards threatened to execute the entire cohort unless the two 
men were given up.  The responsible prisoners identified themselves and were shot.64 
 Prisoners could also choose whether to lie in order to improve their conditions.  Steve 
Perun was worried that he might be poorly treated on account of his Ukrainian ancestry, so he 
was careful to conceal any evidence of it.65  Hank Freedman was raised Jewish, and thus in an 
even more vulnerable position than his fellow men.  Upon arrival at Stalag IX-B, the Germans 
tried to separate all the Jewish prisoners from the rest of the population.  “When they asked 
everybody to [identify themselves], all the men stepped forward.”66  The Germans did eventually 
succeed in segregating the Jewish men, but Freedman remembered the gesture of solidarity as a 
temporary thwart.  Later, as the Allies closed in on the camp, Freedman and his American cohort 
avoided removal from the camp by collectively feigning illness.  “While half of the men 
collapsed, the others carried them into the barracks where they were treated.”67  The ruse paid 
off, and the Americans were able to delay their movement long enough for the Allies to overrun 
the camp’s location. 
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 Sometimes defiance was a matter of survival just as much as morale.  Hugh Colbert and 
his fellow prisoners were held for two days in Koblenz as they awaited transport to a prison 
camp.  “That’s where we got the heavy bombings from the Americans,” Colbert remembered.  
The Germans insisted they had to await orders before moving out, but the prisoners stood their 
ground.  “You can shoot us if you want, but you can’t shoot us all, we’re going to leave… we 
defied their orders… but there was so many of us we could do that.”68  The guards’ captain was 
angry, but acquiesced, and marched the prisoners to their next destination.  Tom Grove also 
found that he could push back against the Germans, if not so directly.  Shortly after his capture, 
he managed to talk a guard out of confiscating his boots, the loss of which would have made his 
march into captivity a much more difficult experience.69 
 
Trade, Cooperation, and Selfishness 
 Despite the consistent scarcity of resources, prisoners generally expected one another to 
share what they had and work to give their entire cohort the best chance at survival.  Outward 
displays of selfishness and outright theft from fellow prisoners happened, but could be met with 
strong opposition.  Just hours after their capture, Mario Garbin and his fellow men found 
themselves caring for a sick soldier.  When most of the group had run out of drinking water, one 
man was discovered with a full canteen.  He offered to sell it to them for five dollars.  
“Somebody told him the equivalent of where that canteen was going to end up lodged if he 
didn’t hand it over,” Garbin remembered.70  
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 American prisoners were meant to receive relief packages from the Red Cross, but these 
were not always delivered, and it was not uncommon for men to have to share.  Hank Freedman 
remembered the almost-humorous predicament of trying to figure out how to split a tin of 
sardines twelve ways.  Even though the food he was given was woefully inadequate (one medic 
estimated that he had been eating about 500 calories per day), Freedman found theft among the 
prisoners even more disturbing.  “Some of the men, believe it or not—their own buddies, would 
get up in the middle of the night and steal that bread out of their pockets.”71  Colbert, while 
living in an overcrowded work camp, recalled keeping his shoes on all the time, lest they be 
stolen.  “When we finally took our shoes off, we would take them and put them under our heads 
as a pillow.”72  Necessity seemed to underpin most acts of selfishness and larceny, but the danger 
from even one’s own fellows must have made the experience all the more trying.   
 Trade was an important part of some prisoners’ success in captivity.  Garbin spoke Italian 
and some German, and was able to prosper in camp by bartering cigarettes with guards and 
prisoners alike in exchange for relative freedom of movement and extra food.73  Commerce was 
not without its risks, however.  Garbin felt that the ire he drew from some of the other prisoners 
(such as the sergeant he threatened with a knife) was due to his success at trading.  Steve Perun 
suffered an even more direct consequence—he was beaten after being caught with extra food.74 
 While hunger and scarcity of resources drove some prisoners to take advantage of one 
another, many kept the faith (or, at least, chose not to record pervasive theft and selfishness) and 
found strength, both physical and psychological, in helping one another.  On the first night Bob 
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Corbin arrived in camp, he did not yet have the privilege of sending mail home, so an old high 
school friend who was also imprisoned there added a line to the bottom of his message so that his 
wife could let Corbin’s family know where he was.75  Since he had previously been classified as 
missing in action, it was the Corbin family’s first confirmation that he was still alive. 
 It is difficult to identify any particular factors that made prisoners more selfish or more 
cooperative, in part because few (and none of these ten) ex-prisoners admit to offenses like theft 
from their own.  Whether this is because honest and cooperative men were more likely to survive 
or because selfish men were less likely to record their stories cannot be told.   
 
Matters of Morale and Hope 
 “You have a choice here: you can either be cynical and go to rot, or you can remember 
and still keep on hoping.  I choose to remember,” wrote Steve Carano in his journal.76  As 
monotony drew one muddy day into the next, he and his fellows recognized the importance of 
morale.  Whether drawing, writing, tinkering with scrap, or simply thinking of home, they kept 
themselves occupied with the idea that something existed other than defeat.  “You might call this 
sentiment,” Carano wrote.  “I do not apologize for it.” 
 Relative to many prisoners, Carano wrote prolifically.  He preserved his experience of 
captivity and the stories of those around him, despite the War Department’s concern that details 
about evasion attempts such as Lassiter’s (which Carano wrote about in his journal) might 
jeopardize future efforts if written down and intercepted by the Germans.77  Carano seemed to 
find the sentimentality he wanted in his writing and drawing.  In between sketches of friends, 
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including Lassiter and Kurtenbach, he filled pages with rude jokes and cartoons of men in drag.78  
Carano’s friend Bill Blackmon remembered finding hope in a different sort of sketch.  Captured 
Americans had taken to drawing “Kilroy” cartoons on the walls of isolation cells in interrogation 
centers, reminding future occupants that their comrades-in-arms were not yet broken.79 
 Peter Neft and some of his peers were bold enough not to make any attempt to hide their 
Jewish faith, even though they knew about the Germans’ hatred for them.  “An Englishman 
removed the cross from the camp chapel on Saturdays and replaced it with a Star of David so we 
could use the space to have a service of our own,” he recalled.  “We were crazy.”80  Crazy or not, 
Neft and his fellow Jewish prisoners felt the need to maintain their sense of self, and found the 
opportunity to do so. 
 Per the Geneva Convention, prisoners were supposed to be supplied with space and 
materials for recreation.81  Depending on the conditions of the camp, prisoners’ experiences 
could vary.  Although the Germans supplied Hank Freedman and his fellow prisoners with a ball, 
starvation made them physically too weak to do much with it.  “We could just sit and sort of roll 
the ball between ourselves.  We didn’t really have the strength, or the motivation for that 
matter…”82  Mario Garbin remembered a decline not in strength but in morale that hamstrung 
some prisoners’ ability to function.  Even though the Germans provided materials for a respectful 
burial of American dead, some prisoners simply lost the motivation to hold funerals.83 
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 Beyond simple acknowledgement that their nationality protected them from the 
mistreatment suffered by other prisoners, multiple American survivors remembered taking 
special confidence in their national identity.  “In spite of all the hardships the American spirits in 
us never died,” reflected Carano.  “Little did we realize how truly great America really is while 
we were flying.  Yet it took but a short while from the time we were shot down until the first 
month after we arrived at [Stalag] XVII to realize who and what we fought for.”84 
 
 Prisoners’ attitudes varied as much as any group of warfighters’ did.  The gulf between 
what was desirable, what was possible, and what was necessary could stretch wide, forcing 
prisoners to improvise.  In the absence of clear direction on how they should conduct themselves 
when evasion and escape were not possible, captured service members had to figure out for 
themselves how best to stay alive, stay motivated, and keep doing their part, however changed, 
in the war.  Some survived by breaking nearly every rule set out—Mario Garbin lied about 
Geneva Convention-required information, disrespected American prisoners of superior rank, and 
even threatened to kill another prisoner—while others, like the relatively well-structured cohort 
in Stalag XVII, organized themselves under competent leadership.  The only true consensus, it 
seems, is that prisoners had to become flexible on almost every matter except the most basic of 
values—the love of country or sense of duty that had pushed them to answer the call to war, the 
desire to see home again, and the camaraderie that prevented most prisoners from taking 
advantage of one another even when their material situation was desperate. 
 Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder remains a salient issue for ex-prisoners, although not 
everyone developed symptoms.  Bob Corbin only suffered one sleepless night of “jangled 
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nerves,” the first night after he completed his escape and reached American protection.85  Hugh 
Colbert lived with undiagnosed symptoms for decades, but recovered once better help was 
available.  He was only grateful that his capture occurred early enough in his military career that 
he did not have to take the life of another human being, having been captured before ever firing a 
shot in Germany.86  Charles Stenger avoided PTSD and credited his success to the maintenance 
of his pre-capture role as a medic.  A sense of control was important, he argued, and successful 
prisoners were willing to “risk injury or punishment” in order to regain it.87  
 As the postwar decades wore on, the popularization of the prisoner of war experience in 
film and television shifted American attitudes.88  With greater appreciation for the challenges 
faced by those who lost their lives and freedom in prison camps, it may be difficult for the 
modern reader to believe the mindsets of the Stalag XVII residents’ families, who told their 
captured loved ones not to come home.  However deep our respect for prisoners and their plight 
may be, it is important to remember that their story is not simply one of passive endurance.  They 
navigated the expectations and realities of their condition in real time, sometimes without 
significant training or guidance.  Their agency—not only in resistance to the Germans, but in 
deciding not to attempt dangerous escape, in flouting expectations to improve their own 
conditions, even in conflict with other prisoners—is at least as important as the tribulations they 
faced in captivity.   
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